Abstract-The literature documents that charitable giving is responsive to tax subsidies but often ignores the spillover effects of such policies. This paper investigates the spillover effects of charitable subsidies on religious participation using individual-level panel data. The results show that religious giving and participation are complements. The implied cross-price elasticity of religious participation with respect to the after-tax price of giving is À0.27. Furthermore, a 1% increase in the amount of religious contributions is associated with a 0.4% increase in religious attendance. These results are robust under several different specifications and highlight the positive externalities created by charitable subsidies.
I. Introduction
I N the United States and several other countries, charitable contributions are tax deductible. This policy makes a charitable donation less costly for those who itemize deductions on their federal or state income tax returns. According to the most recent estimate, the federal government is estimated to have $49 billion in foregone revenue in 2010 due to millions of households that itemize charitable deductions in their federal tax returns (Joint Committee on Taxation, 2008) . The economic rationales for providing tax subsidies for charitable contributions are well documented.
1 Recent literature also documents that the amount of charitable contributions responsive to tax subsidies.
2 However, the indirect effects of charitable subsidies is relatively unknown.
3
Using a panel data set of individuals, this paper documents the impact of charitable subsidies on religious giving and investigates the spillover effects of such policies on religious participation.
In the United States, religious institutions are the largest recipients of charitable contributions. 4 In addition, over twothirds of Americans belong to a church or other religious organization, and two-fifths of Americans attend church in a typical week (Iannaccone, 1998) . 5 The literature documents that religiosity is a major determinant of well-being among Americans. 6 Several studies also find a strong association between religious participation and a wide range of economically important social behavior, such as educational attainment, voting behavior, criminal activity, drug and alcohol consumption, physical and mental health, and marriage, fertility, and divorce.
7 Therefore, understanding the direct and indirect effects of charitable subsidies on religious giving and participation is important, and findings from empirical analysis may help policymakers make informed choices about the spillover effects of charitable subsidies.
The relationship between religious giving and participation is ambiguous. Religious participation can be either a complement to or a substitute for the level of religious donations. On the one hand, as points out, if giving occurs in a religious setting, if individuals wish to monitor the impact of increased levels of their donations, or if the ''warm glow'' of giving is operative only when participating, then religious giving and attendance could be complementary. In this case, higher subsidies to charitable giving would lead to an increase in religious participation. On the other hand, a classic model of religiosity (Azzi & Ehrenberg, 1975) predicts that giving and religiosity are substitutes. Furthermore, a handful of empirical studies that have previously investigated the relationship between religious giving and attendance provide mixed results. However, the results from the existing studies may be prone to omitted variable bias due to the lack of appropriate panel data that contain information on both religious giving and attendance.
In order to address this shortcoming, in this paper, I use a newly available panel data set of individuals that contains detailed information on religious giving and participation: the philanthropy module of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). I argue that this data set has several advantages compared with other data sets of its kind and enables one to control for unobserved individual time-invariant characteristics that may jointly affect religious giving and participation. Following and Kim (2013) , I exploit the variation in the subsidization of charitable giving in the United States over time, across income levels, and across states and use the after-tax price of giving as an instru-ment for religious giving in order to identify the relationship between religious giving and attendance. I expect that the after-tax price should be negatively correlated with the propensity to give to religious organizations and the amount of religious contributions but uncorrelated with the unobserved variables that may affect religious participation after several time-dependent observable factors and individual fixed effects are controlled for.
The results imply that religious giving and attendance are complements. Increasing the tax price of giving decreases religious contributions and at the same time negatively affects the religious participation rate. Therefore, policies that encourage religious giving have positive spillover effects on religious attendance. In models that control for the unobserved individual fixed effects, a 1% increase in the after-tax price of giving is associated with a 0.1 percentage point decrease in the probability of giving to a religious organization and 0.6% decrease in the amount of religious contributions. The implied cross-price elasticity of religious participation with respect to the after-tax price of giving is À0.27. These results are also robust to the potential endogeneity of income, itemization status, and the tax price and the possible existence of omitted factors that vary jointly by income level and year, jointly by state and year, and jointly by state and income level. Using the after-tax price of charitable giving as an instrument for religious giving, I also document the relationship between religious giving and religious participation. I find that a 1% increase in the amount of religious contributions is associated with a 0.4% increase in religious attendance.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents a review of the literature on religious giving and attendance. Section III presents the data and discusses the empirical methodology. Section IV discusses the results and presents several robustness checks. Section V provides a discussion of policy implications and concludes.
II. Literature Review

A. Charitable Subsidies and Religious Giving
A sizable literature is devoted to assessing the elasticity of charitable giving with respect to its after-tax price. Andreoni (2006) provides a detailed survey of theoretical and empirical studies in this literature. However, relatively little attention in the literature has been given to the estimation of this elasticity separately for religious giving. Several papers model religious giving explicitly. For instance, McClelland and Kokoski (1994) provide a model of religious giving and, using survey data from the early 1980s, find that religious giving is much less price elastic than nonreligious giving. Similarly, using a cross-section of households from PSID, Brooks (2007) finds that compared with other types of charitable contributions, religious giving is less responsive to changes in charitable subsidies. In contrast, using the data of the Survey of Social Development Trends from Taiwan, Chang (2005) finds stronger price effects for religious giving. Bradley, Holden, and McClelland (2005) model total and nonreligious giving, so that religious giving is a residual. They find that religious giving is less price elastic compared with nonreligious giving.
The main empirical problem, widely discussed in the literature, is the endogeneity of the after-tax price of giving. The most common approach to address this problem is to use the first-dollar tax price, which excludes charitable contributions, as an instrument for the after-tax price. An alternative approach is using state tax rates as an instrument for the after-tax price. However, states that adopt different tax rates may differ systematically in unobserved ways. These unobserved differences may affect both the marginal tax rates and giving propensities. In the empirical models I present, I rely on the extensive variation over time, within income levels, and within states to control for both income and fixed state differences in identifying the effect of charitable subsidies. Furthermore, the panel structure of the data allows me to control for unobserved individual factors that might be correlated with both the after-tax price and religious giving. As a robustness check, I also estimate twostage models using the first-dollar price as an instrument for the after-tax price of giving. Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975) provide the first formal theoretical model for the household production of religiosity. In this model, individuals allocate their time and goods among religious and secular commodities so as to maximize lifetime and ''afterlife'' utility. As individuals allocate more of their time and money to religious commodities, it lowers consumption today but increases consumption in the afterlife. Iannaccone (1998) argues that this model predicts that time and money devoted to religion are substitutes since afterlife consumption is jointly produced by time and money, and as more money is contributed, the marginal utility of time falls for afterlife consumption relative to current consumption.
B. Charitable Subsidies and Religiosity
A handful of papers have formally investigated the relationship between religious giving and participation. The empirical findings are mixed. Olson and Caddell (1994) , Forbes and Zampelli (1997) , Iannaccone (1997) , Dahl and Ransom (1999) , and Lunn, Klay, and Douglass (2001) find a positive relationship between attendance and contributions, suggesting complementarity between religious giving and participation. argues that these studies suffer from omitted variable bias and fail to control for unobserved factors that may jointly effect giving and religiosity. Sullivan (1985) and Clain and Zech (1999) address this problem by estimating reduced forms of simultaneous equations models, which include predicted contributions in participation models, and vice versa. Sullivan (1985) assumes that whether one ''considers sacramental participation necessary for salvation'' is correlated with religious participation but not contributions and that church size and 1709 THE IMPACT OF CHARITABLE SUBSIDIES ON RELIGION whether one ''considers tithing necessary for salvation'' affect contributions but not attendance. Clain and Zech (1999) assume that the square of income, home ownership, the square of age, and wife's education affect religious giving but not attendance, and that own education, number of children, and religious preference affect religious participation but not contributions. Both studies conclude that charitable giving and attendance are complements.
However, argues that the instruments Sullivan (1985) and Clain and Zech (1999) used are questionable, and it is hard to conceive of exogenous factors (other than tax laws) correlated with religious contributions but not attendance, or vice versa. Then he argues that charitable subsidies (1 minus the after-tax price of giving) vary in ways that are exogenous to both giving and religiosity, providing an independent instrument for identifying the substitutability or complementarity of these two behaviors. Using pooled crosssections from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX), he estimates reduced-form models of religious giving and finds that the after-tax price elasticity of giving is À0.47. Hence, a 1% increase in charitable subsidies is associated with an approximately 0.5% increase in religious giving. Next, he uses pooled cross-sectional data from the General Social Survey (GSS) to show that the same magnitude of increase in the subsidy decreases religious participation by 0.5%. Using the impact of subsidies on religious giving and attendance, he concludes that each 1% rise in charitable giving leads to around a 0.6% to 1.1% decline in religious attendance, which suggests that these two behaviors are substitutes.
Kim (2013) provides a major criticism for Gruber's findings. He uses pooled cross-sectional data from three waves of Survey of Giving and Volunteering in the United States (SGV) and employs the same empirical strategy that has used. In sharp contrast to , he finds that the cross-price elasticity of religious attendance with respect to the after-tax price of giving is À0.4, which implies that charitable giving and religious attendance are complements. Kim (2013) argues that due to the lack of data, imputes itemization status for each respondent, which creates a large amount of nonclassical measurement error. He shows that when he also imputes itemization status as opposed to using survey-reported itemization status, he obtains results similar to those of .
The empirical analysis presented in this paper is similar to that of and Kim (2013) . However, I use a panel data set instead of independent cross-sections. This panel data set not only allows controlling for possible omitted variables that may affect religious giving, attendance, and charitable subsidies but also contains more reliable information on religious attendance and other variables that are used to calculate the after-tax price of giving for each respondent. Furthermore, in contrast to and Kim (2013) , I explicitly document the relationship between religious giving and attendance in two-stage models and separately investigate the effect of charitable subsidies by gender, race, marital status, and religious affiliation. 8 Compared with the other surveys of its kind such as the SGV, the GSS, and the CEX, the COPPS has several advantages.
First, it is the only panel survey that contains information on religious contributions and attendance and therefore allows controlling for unobserved individual fixed effects that may be correlated with these variables.
Second, in contrast to the GSS and CEX, it contains information on whether the respondent itemized a charitable deduction. This information is particularly important to estimate the effect of charitable subsidies on religious giving and attendance since those who do not itemize deductions cannot be subsidized.
Third, in contrast to the SGV and GSS, the COPPS contains detailed information on several variables that are used to calculate the marginal tax rates such as income and itemized deductions. For instance, the SGV and GSS report income in categories; hence, one has to impute household income in order to calculate the marginal tax rate.
9 Similarly, neither the SGV nor the GSS contains information on itemized deductions such as health care expenses, mortgage payments, property taxes, rent paid, and child care expenses, and therefore information on these variables has to be imputed in order to calculate the marginal tax rate for each household. 10 Fourth, in contrast to the SGV and GSS, the COPPS contains more reliable information on religious attendance. It clearly identifies the number of days that the respondent attended a religious service per week, month, or year, while the SGV and GSS report this information as an index variable. For example, rather than asking the exact number of days of religious attendance, the GSS asks a nationally representative sample of respondents about the frequency of their religious attendance and allows nine possible responses to this question: never, less than once per year, about once or twice a year, several times a year, about once a month, two to three times a month, nearly every week, every week, and several times a week.
Finally, Wilhelm (2006 Wilhelm ( , 2007 argues that the quality of the COPPS data may be superior to data collected in other household surveys of charitable giving because of the PSID staff's experience in collecting data and the respondents' experience with the survey procedure.
I link the information from the COPPS with the PSID individual data on each respondent and create an unbalanced panel of individuals over two years. I restrict my sample to household heads and wives since the PSID contains demographic information only for these groups. Eliminating the observations with missing key variables yields a representative sample of 31,092 observations over two years.
11 Table 1 presents the description of key variables and sample weighted summary statistics.
12 On average, 50% of the respondents reported contributing to religious organizations with an average contribution of $1,057.
13
Alternatively, on average, people give 1.3% of their income to religious organizations. This estimate is comparable to the religious giving rates from other sources of charitable giving data.
14 The average tax subsidy to charitable giving in the sample is 12.5%. 15 Again, this estimate is comparable to the estimates from other sources of charitable giving data. 16 In the COPPS, there exists a fairly broad distribution of the frequency of attendance at religious services ranging from no attendance to few people reporting attendance every day. On average, people reported attending at a religious service 2.5 times a month.
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B. The After-Tax Price of Giving
In the United States, households are allowed to itemize charitable deductions on their federal and most state personal income tax returns. Therefore, each dollar given to charity costs less than a dollar if the household itemizes deductions. Following the standard practice in the literature, I compute the after-tax price of giving, which incorporates charitable contributions, as 1 À t for those who itemize deductions and 1 for those who do not, where t is the sum of the federal and state marginal tax rates that the donor faces.
PSID contains a question that obtains information on whether the respondent itemized deductions. In order to calculate the marginal tax rates for each individual at a given year, I use the National Bureau of Economic Research 11 I eliminated several observations due to missing or unreliable information. This includes 163 respondents who reported attending a religious service more than thirty times a month, 104 respondents with unreliable information on educational attainment, 1,280 respondents with unreliable information on race, and 3,454 respondents with unreliable information on age.
12 I use PSID's individual weights to calculate the sample weighted summary statistics. The number of observations with nonzero weights is 21,572. Although I report the nonweighted regression estimates for the rest of the paper, weighted and nonweighted estimation results are very similar. The weighted regression estimates are available on request. 13 The amounts of religious contributions and household income are reported in 2005 dollars throughout the paper.
14 In the CEX, this rate is 1.1% . In the 2001 edition of the SGV, this rate is 1.5%. 15 The average tax subsidy is calculated as 1 minus the after-tax price of giving.
16 reports that the average tax subsidy to charitable giving, factoring in the odds of itemization by income, is 9.4% in the CEX and 10% in the GSS. I estimate that the average subsidy in the 2001 edition of the SGV is 11.2%. The slightly higher subsidy rates on average in the PSID may be due to the higher levels of average income in this data set. 18 This model inputs information on household income, state of residence, marital status, number of children, age, child care expenses, itemized deductions such as charitable donations and health care expenses, mortgage interest payments, and property taxes or rent paid and outputs federal and state marginal tax rates for each individual. The information on all these variables is available at the PSID.
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As points out, the resulting after-tax prices of giving vary across the respondents primarily due to the differences in income, state of residence, and time. Highincome taxpayers have relatively higher marginal tax rates, and hence a more sizable reduction in their tax burden from deductions to their taxable income. There were significant changes in the schedule of tax rates from 2003 to 2005 at the federal level, which are incorporated into the calculation of marginal tax rates. For instance, in addition to several new deductions and credits introduced during this period, in 2003, the tax rates of 27%, 30%, 35%, and 38.6% were reduced to 25%, 28%, 33%, and 35%, respectively; new reporting requirements for noncash charitable contributions were introduced in 2004; and income-based limits for cash charitable donations were lifted in 2005.
20 Tax subsidies to charity vary across states due to the considerable variation in state income tax systems as well. A number of states follow the federal tax laws, so charitable contributions are fully deductible for itemizers, while some others ask taxpayers to explicitly report their federally itemized amounts from their state taxable income. Furthermore, several states do not allow a deduction for charitable contributions. From 2003 to 2005, there were also several significant changes in the schedule of income tax rates at the state level. For example, in 2003, the state income tax rate was reduced by 1% in Rhode Island and Michigan. In 2004, New York moved from a tax system with five brackets to one with nine brackets. In 2005, New Mexico moved from a tax system with six brackets to one with five brackets and reduced the tax rates up to 1%. Other states that made significant changes to their tax systems during this period include Hawaii, Maryland, District of Columbia, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Jersey, Oklahoma, and Vermont.
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In the PSID, there is a considerable amount of variation in the after-tax price of giving within individuals over time. In particular, I estimate that for more than 51% of the respondents, the after-tax price of giving changed from 2003 to 2005. Similar variation also exists within income levels over time. In table 2, I report the mean after-tax price for deciles of income expressed in 2005 prices. Except for the fourth, sixth, nineth, and tenth deciles, the change in the after-tax price within the same income level over time is statistically significant. Therefore, although the time period considered is relatively short due to the data restrictions, tax policy changes at the federal and state level from 2003 to 2005 created a considerable amount of variation in the after-tax price in order to identify the relationship between religious giving and attendance. Moreover, income, time, and state may be independently correlated with both charitable behavior and religious attendance. In addition to several other demographic variables, the empirical models explicitly control for the effects of these variables on religious giving and attendance.
C. Empirical Strategy
The empirical model follows that of and Kim (2013) with a key difference of the inclusion of unobserved individual effects as additional controls. Hence, I Andreoni, Brown, and Rischall (2003) , and Yörük (2009 Yörük ( , 2010 , I assumed that those who are married report joint filing status. Following , I use total family income instead of using separate incomes for heads and wives. Following Reinstein (2010) , I solve for the mortgage interest payment for the first mortgage and ignore second and third mortgages, and approximate by assuming one payment a year. In addition to charitable giving, I also incorporate other deductions such as health care costs. Reinstein (2010) 
where Y denotes one of the outcomes (whether the respondent donated to a religious organization, the amount of her religious contributions, and her average number of days of religious attendance per month); X is a set of demographic control variables; Inc is the natural logarithm of household income; price is the natural logarithm of the after-tax price of giving; d s is the full set of state effects; g t is the fixed time effect, which is equal to unity for 2005; l i is the individual fixed effects, which controls for unobserved individual effects that are time invariant but may affect the outcome variables; and e is the residual disturbance term that is assumed to be uncorrelated with X, Inc, price, d s , g t , and l i .
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The set of demographic controls, X, consists of timedependent individual specific variables such as family size, number of children under 18 years old, binary controls for employment status, marital status, and educational attainment. 23 In addition to unobserved individual effects that are time invariant, the model controls for direct effects of income, state of residence, and time. However, as robustness checks, I also estimate models that control for the interactions of income, state, and year, that address the possible endogeneity of income, itemization status, and the after-tax price, and that control for the censored or binary nature of the dependent variables.
IV. Results
A. Impact of Charitable Subsidies on the Probability of
Giving to Religious Organizations Table 3 reports the effect of charitable subsidies on the probability of giving to religious organizations. 24 The first column presents the estimates from the benchmark ordinary least squares (OLS) model, which does not control for unobserved individual fixed effects that may affect the probability of giving to religious organizations. As expected, the probability of giving goes down as the after-price of giving goes up (the charitable subsidy goes down). For the full sample, this model suggests that a 1% increase in the after-tax price of giving is associated with a 0.42 percentage point decrease in the probability of giving to a religious organization. I also estimate this effect by gender, race, marital status, and religious affiliation. The impact of charitable subsidies on the probability of giving to a religious organization differs considerably by race but not by gender. On average, whites are less responsive to charitable subsidies compared with blacks. A 1% increase in the after-tax price of giving decreases whites' probability of religious giving by 0.37 percentage points, whereas the same magnitude of increase in the tax price is associated with a 0.75 percentage point decrease in blacks' probability of giving to religious organizations. Unmarried respondents appear to be more responsive to charitable subsidies. For this group, the after-tax price elasticity of the probability of religious giving is À0.56. A major- The effect of log(after-tax price of giving) on the decision to give to a religious organization is reported. All regressions include a set of control variables and state and year effects as discussed in the text and as presented in table 1. FE and IV-FE models also control for individual fixed effects but exclude time-invariant covariates such as gender, race, and age. Average marginal effects are reported for probit and IV-probit models. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses. Statistically significant at *10%, **5%, and ***1%.
22 I also estimate models without controlling for the state fixed effects. Although not reported, the estimates from these models are very similar to those presented in this paper. 23 Definitions of control variables are presented in table 1. All nominal variables are expressed in 2005 dollars. As a benchmark, I also estimate OLS models by pooling data from two time periods. In addition to timedependent characteristics, these models also control for time-invariant individual characteristics such as gender, race, and age. 24 In these models, the dependent variable is a binary variable which is equal to 1 if the respondent reported donating to a religious organization during the survey year.
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ity of the sample in the COPPS consists of Protestants and Catholics.
25 Estimating separate regressions for these groups, I find that Protestants are more responsive to charitable subsidies compared to Catholics. The probability of religious giving for Catholics goes down by 0.31 percentage points as a response to a 1% increase in the tax price of giving, whereas Protestants decrease their probability of religious giving by 0.45 percentage points as a response to the same magnitude of change in the tax price.
Although the tax price of the last dollar contributed is the most economically meaningful, it also depends on the donation amount. In order to address the possible endogeneity of the after-tax price of giving, I instrument this variable with the first-dollar price of giving and reestimate a two-stage least squares (2SLS) model. 26 The results reported in the second column of table 3 show that controlling for endogeneity of the after-tax price slightly increases the estimated effect of the charitable subsidies for all groups. For the full sample, 2SLS model suggests that a 1% increase in the after-tax price of giving is associated with a 0.44 percentage point decrease in the probability of giving to a religious organization. Furthermore, this effect remains highly significant. The OLS and 2SLS models do not control for the discrete nature of the outcome variable. In order to address this problem, I estimate several probit-type models. The marginal effects from these models reported in the third and fourth columns of table 3 show that compared with the OLS models, probit-type models yield a smaller impact of the after-tax price on the probability of giving to religious organizations. The last two columns of table 3 report estimates from the fixed effects (FE) models.
27 Compared with OLS, 2SLS, probit, and IV-probit models, FE and IV-FE models yield a considerably smaller effect of the after-tax price on the probability of giving to a religious organization. In both models, for the full sample, a 1% increase in the after-tax price of giving is associated with a 0.1 percentage point decrease in the probability of giving to a religious organization. Furthermore, for blacks and Catholics, this effect is not statistically significant at conventional significance levels. Table 4 presents the estimated effect of charitable subsidies on the amount of religious contributions under different specifications.
28 For the full sample, OLS and tobit models suggest that the amount of religious contributions tends to decrease by 2.1% to 3.5% as a response to a 1% increase in The effect of log(after-tax price of giving) on log(amount of religious contributions þ 1) is reported. All regressions include a set of control variables, and state and year effects as discussed in the text and as presented in table 1. FE and IV-FE models also control for individual fixed effects but exclude time-invariant covariates such as gender, race, and age. Average marginal effects calculated at E[Y|Y>0, X) are reported for tobit and IV-tobit models. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses. Statistically significant at * 10%, ** 5%, and *** 1%.
25 Although the COPPS contains information on other religious preferences, more that 85% of the sample is either Catholic or Protestant. Here, I report separate regression results only for these two groups. The results for other religious groups are available on request. 26 The first-dollar tax price, which is the marginal tax rate that applies to the first dollar donated to the charity, is a widely used instrument in the literature (Andreoni, 2006) . I use the TAXSIM model to calculate this variable under the assumption that the respondents do not claim a charitable deduction. For the 2SLS and IV-probit models, in the first stage, I estimate an OLS regression of the after-tax price on the first-dollar price and other control variables. For the IV-FE model, in the first stage, I estimate an FE regression of the after-tax price on the first-dollar price and timedependent control variables. In all regressions, the coefficient of the firstdollar price is significant at 1% significance level. These results are presented in appendix table A2 (available online). 27 I also estimate corresponding random effects models, which assume that unobserved individual fixed effects are uncorrelated with the independent variables. However, Hausman tests suggest that the FE models are appropriate for the full sample and all subsamples. Hence, I report only estimates from the FE models. The detailed estimates from the FE models are reported in appendix table A1 (available online). Estimates from the random effects models are available on request.
28 In these models, the dependent variable is log(amount of religious contributions þ 1). I add 1 to the amount of religious contributions so that the log-transformed variable is still censored at 0. This is a standard practice in the literature.
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THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS the after-tax price. Models that control for the possible endogeneity of charitable subsidies using the first-dollar price of giving as an instrument, the 2SLS and IV-tobit models, yield comparable estimates. Estimates from the FE and IV-FE models reported in the last two columns of table 4 show that the effect of charitable subsidies on religious giving is much smaller once the unobserved individual effects are controlled for. These models suggest that a 1% increase in the after-tax price of giving is associated with around a 0.6% decrease in the amount of religious contributions. 29 On average, this corresponds to a $6 increase in religious donations as a response to each percentage point increase in the charitable subsidy. In general, the estimated effect of the aftertax price on the amount of religious contributions is robust to the selection of the sample based on gender, race, marital status, and religious affiliation, except for Catholics. Catholics tend to decrease their religious giving by 0.2% to 0.3% as a response to a 1% increase in the after-tax price of giving. However, this effect is not statistically significant.
C. Impact of Charitable Subsidies on Religious Attendance
This analysis confirms the findings of the earlier literature and documents that religious giving is quite sensitive to charitable subsidies. This section turns to an analysis of the impact of charitable subsidies on religious attendance. In contrast to , table 5 shows that charitable subsidies have a positive impact on religious attendance, which suggests that religious giving and attendance are economic complements. 30 Results from the OLS and tobit models reported in the first two columns suggest that a 1% increase in charitable subsidies is associated with around a 0.5% to 0.6% increase in religious attendance. The effect of the charitable subsidies on religious attendance decreases considerably when the unobserved individual fixed effects are controlled for. Estimates from the FE models reported in the third column of table 5 suggest that religious attendance decreases by 0.27% as a response to a 1% increase in the after-tax price of giving. This effect is relatively small but highly significant. On average, people reported attending a religious service 2.5 times a month. Hence, at the mean of the sample, a 10% increase in charitable subsidies increases religious attendance by 0.07 days per month. Compared with the full sample, blacks and unmarried people are more responsive to charitable subsidies. A 1% increase in the after-tax price decreases religious attendance by 0.8% for blacks and 0.6% for unmarried respondents. On the other hand, the FE models estimated for different groups show that although the effect of charitable subsidies on religious attendance remains positive, it is insignificant for whites and Catholics.
The last three columns in table 5 present comparable models in which the outcome variable is in the level form-the average number of days per month that the respondent reported attending a religious service. Compared with the models estimated using the log-transformed The effect of log(after-tax price of giving) on religious attendance is reported. In the first three columns, the dependent variable is log(average number of days that the respondent reported attending a religious service per month þ 0.1). In the last three columns, the dependent variable is the average number of days that the respondent reported attending a religious service per month. All regressions include a set of control variables, and state and year effects as discussed in the text and as presented in table 1. FE models also control for individual fixed effects but exclude time-invariant covariates such as gender, race, and age. In the second column, average marginal effects calculated at E[Y|Y > log(0.1), X) are reported for tobit models. In the fifth column, average marginal effects calculated at E[Y|Y > 0, X) are reported for tobit models. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses. Statistically significant at *10%, **5%, and ***1%.
29 Although OLS and tobit models yield similar results, Honore (1992) proposes a method for estimating a censored outcome model with fixed effects in a panel data setting. The practical difficulty in implementing this estimator is to calculate the marginal effects after the regression. However, in this model, the coefficient on the after-tax price remains negative and highly significant, which suggests that charitable subsidies increase religious contributions. These results are available on request. 30 In the first three columns, the dependent variable is log(number of days that the respondent reported attending a religious service per month þ 0.1). In order to check the sensitivity of estimates to this transformation, the last three columns report estimates from the models in which the outcome variable is in the level form. In all models, following , the main identifying assumption is that the after-tax price of giving affects religious attendance only through religious giving.
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outcome, these models generate a slightly smaller impact of charitable subsidies on religious attendance. For the full sample, they suggest that when the after-tax price goes up by 10%, people tend to decrease their religious attendance by 0.04 days per month. The FE models suggest that for females, blacks, those unmarried, and Protestants, the same magnitude of increase in the after-tax price is associated with a 0.06, 0.18, 0.14, and 0.08 day per month decrease in religious participation, respectively. The impact of the after-tax price remains insignificant for males, whites, and Catholics. Furthermore, these estimates are quite similar to but slightly lower than the estimates from Kim (2013) , who finds that the tax price elasticity of religious attendance is À0.4.
D. Robustness Checks
Endogeneity of income. A potential concern with the main results presented in table 5 is the endogeneity of incomes to religiosity. If more time spent at religious services reduces the time available to generate income, this could decrease the subsidy to charitable giving and impose a bias to above estimates. Alternatively, if those who attend religious services frequently are also those who earn more, this could raise the tax subsidy to charitable giving and impose a positive bias to the relationship estimated in table 5. In order to address the potential endogeneity of income, I follow two distinct approaches. First, I follow Auten and Carroll (1999) , Gruber and Saez (2002) , and Lochner and Dahl (2012) and exploit the exogenous changes in marginal tax rates for a given income. That is, I estimate the change in tax price for each individual by holding income constant in both periods and estimate the tax price in each period at the same income level. 31 Since income is held fixed, changes in the tax price for each individual are due to changes in tax policy over time, and the tax price change is truly exogenous with respect to each individual. I present the results from this alternative approach in the first specification of table 6. The findings imply that religious attendance decreases by 0.2% to 0.64% in response to a 1% increase in the after-tax price. Similarly, a 10% increase in the after-tax price decreases religious attendance by around 0.03 to 0.05 days per month. Gruber and Saez (2002) argue that changes in tax policies may be causally related to changes in the pretax income distribution over time.
32 Furthermore, tax reforms may affect different points in the income distribution in different ways. In order to address these problems, following Gruber and Saez (2002) and , I add, in addition to log income, a ten-piece spline in log income to religious participation models. The second specification in table 6 shows that this alternative approach yields similar results. In the FE models, a 1% increase in the after-tax price is associated with a 0.18% decrease in religious attendance. Following Lochner and Dahl (2012) , I also estimate religious participation models that control for a flexible fifth-order polynomial The effect of log(after-tax price of giving) on religious attendance is reported. In the first three columns, the dependent variable is log(average number of days that the respondent reported attending a religious service per month þ 0.1). In the last three columns the dependent variable is the average number of days that the respondent reported attending a religious service per month. All regressions include a set of control variables, and state and year effects as discussed in the text and as presented in table 1. FE models also control for individual fixed effects but exclude time-invariant covariates such as gender, race, and age. In the second column, average marginal effects calculated at E[Y|Y > log(0.1), X) are reported for tobit models. In the fifth column, average marginal effects calculated at E[Y|Y > 0, X) are reported for tobit models. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses. Statistically significant at *10%, **5%, and ***1%. 32 Gruber and Saez (2002) argue that the distribution of income has been widening since the mid-1970s. This resulted in a series of tax reforms over time.
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THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS of log income. Although not reported, the results from these models are statistically significant and imply that religious attendance decreases by 0.19% in response to a 1% increase in the after-tax price. controls for the potential endogeneity of income in religious participation models using predicted income instead of actual income to calculate the marginal tax rates. Following , I first predict household income based on the exogenous characteristics included in the empirical models such as age, sex, race, marital status, family size, number of children, educational attainment, and employment status. I then use this predicted income to calculate marginal tax rates in the same fashion as with actual income. 33 The third specification in table 6 reports the results from this approach. The impact of the charitable subsidies on religious attendance remains positive and highly significant. The results from the alternative models suggest that when the price of charitable giving goes up by 1%, religious attendance tends to go down by 0.2% to 1.1%. Alternative specifications of the religious participation models reported in the last three columns of table 6 yield comparable estimates. These models suggest that a 10% increase in the after-tax price increases religious attendance by around 0.03 to 0.12 days per month.
In the fourth specification of table 6, I estimate alternative models that control for log predicted income and a tenpiece spline in log predicted income. These models yield virtually the same results compared with the third specification. Therefore the estimates from the main models are robust to the potential endogeneity of income.
34
Endogeneity of itemization status. Another potential source of endogeneity comes from an individual's decision to itemize, as this decision is partially determined by the amount of charitable donation. In order to control for this endogeneity problem, a common practice in the literature is to exclude endogenous itemizers, who would not itemize deductions in the absence of a deduction for charitable contributions, from the sample (Lankford & Wyckoff, 1991; Auten, Sieg, & Clotfelter, 2002) . I estimate that slightly more than 4% of the respondents in the sample would not have itemized deductions and hence choose a standard deduction if charitable contributions were not tax deductible. In order to identify these endogenous itemizers, following Backus (2010) , I calculate the total amount of itemized deductions for each respondent with and without the charitable contributions and compare these amounts with the standard deduction for the relevant year. For endogenous itemizers, the total amount of itemized deductions should be greater than the standard deduction only when the charitable contributions are included with the itemized deductions.
35
I reestimate religious participation models by excluding the endogenous itemizers from the sample. The results reported in the fifth specification of table 6 show that under most of the specifications, the effect of the after-tax price on religious participation remains negative and statistically significant. In particular, when endogenous itemizers are excluded from the sample, religious attendance decreases by 0.25% to 0.36% in response to a 1% increase in the after-tax price. Similarly, the results from the FE model reported in the last column of table 6 suggest that a 10% increase in the after-tax price decreases religious attendance by almost 0.03 days per month. Therefore, in general, the estimates from the main models are robust to the potential endogeneity of the itemization status.
Omitted factors. The remaining specifications reported in table 6 address the potential omitted factors that may be correlated with both charitable subsidies and religious participation. These models include interactions between income and year, state and year, and state and income as additional controls. The interaction between household income and year captures any potential national shocks that may have occurred over time and may have a heterogeneous effect on different income groups. Inclusion of this interaction term does not change the impact of charitable subsidies on religious participation. The FE model suggests that the elasticity of religious attendance with respect to after-tax price remains À0.27.
The interactions between state and year dummies absorb any changes in states over time that have the same impact on all income levels. Inclusion of these interaction terms to religious participation models does not change the key coefficient on the after-tax price of giving. Compared with the full-sample results reported in table 5, the impact of the after-tax price on religious participation remains virtually the same.
The interaction dummies between income and each state dummy capture any differences in religious participation by income level across states. Again, inclusion of these interaction dummies changes the coefficient on the after-tax price only slightly, and in this specification, the elasticity of 33 I use the TAXSIM model to calculate the marginal tax rates with this alternative measure of income. 34 Other important factors that may affect the changes in marginal tax rates over time include the changes in marital status and number of children in the household. In the PSID, only 7% of the respondents changed their marital status from 2003 to 2005. During this period, the number of children 18 years old and younger changed in 24% of the households. Although I explicitly control for these factors in my regressions, excluding the respondents who experienced a change in at least one of these variables from 2003 to 2005 does not affect the estimated impact of the after-tax price on religious giving and attendance. Although not reported, these results are available from me on request. 35 Following Backus (2010) , I calculate the total amount of itemized deductions as the sum of the interest paid on mortgage, child care expenses, medical expenses, charitable contributions, property taxes paid, and state taxes and other deductions predicted as 2% of aggregate gross income. Backus (2010) uses household-level data from the 2001, 2003, and 2005 waves of the PSID to estimate income and price elasticities of donations to six charitable causes. He estimates that in his sample, 4.6% of the households are endogeneous itemizers. This finding is comparable to my estimate.
THE IMPACT OF CHARITABLE SUBSIDIES ON RELIGION
religious attendance with respect to the after-tax price is À0.25. Therefore, the estimated negative impact of charitable subsidies on religious participation cannot be explained by the existence of omitted variables that vary jointly by income level and year, jointly by state and year, and jointly by state and income level.
36
Robustness checks for subsamples. I also test the robustness of the main results for alternative subsamples. In table 7, I report the results from FE models in which the dependent variable is the log of religious attendance. For males, the effect of the after-tax price on religious attendance becomes insignificant once the endogeneity of income and itemization status is controlled for. For females, the elasticity of religious attendance with respect to the after-tax price is significant under all specifications and ranges from À0.24 to À0.36. These estimates are comparable to the findings from the main model. Compared with the main findings reported in table 5, the effect of charitable subsidies on religious attendance are considerably different for whites and blacks. While blacks are quite responsive to charitable subsidies, the effect of charitable subsidies on religious attendance is insignificant for whites. The results reported in table 7 suggest that for blacks, religious attendance decreases by 0.70% to 0.86% in response to a 1% increase in the after-tax price. The effect of the after-tax price of giving on religious attendance remains significant for unmarried respondents as well. For this group, the results from alternative robustness checks imply that a 1% increase in the after-tax price is associated with a 0.44% to 0.59% decrease in religious attendance. Compared with the main findings, the effect of charitable subsidies on religious attendance remains positive and statistically significant for Protestants. For this group, under alternative robustness checks, the elasticity of religious attendance with respect to the after-tax price differs between À0.15 and À0.29. For Catholics, similar to main findings, the effect of charitable subsidies on religious attendance remains to insignificant when endogeneity of income is controlled for. Therefore, for different subsamples of respondents, the estimates from the main models are robust to the potential endogeneity of income, itemization status, and the presence of possible omitted factors that vary jointly by income level and year, jointly by state and year, and jointly by state and income level.
E. Impact of Religious Giving on Religious Attendance
So far, I have presented the results from several reducedform models that identify the relationship between charitable subsidies and religious giving and attendance. In this section, I investigate the relationship between religious giving and religious participation using the after-tax price of giving as an instrument for religious giving. I report results from 2SLS, IV-tobit, and IV-FE models. In these models, The effect of log(after-tax price of giving) on religious attendance is reported. The dependent variable in all regressions is log(average number of days that the respondent reported attending a religious service per month þ 0.1). All regressions include a set of time-dependent control variables and individual, state, and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses. The number of observations is reported in brackets. The estimate is statistically significant at *10%, **5%, and ***1%.
36 I also include all three interaction terms jointly to religious participation models. These models yield similar estimates.
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THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS the main identifying assumption is that the after-tax price of giving affects religious participation only through religious giving. 37 Therefore, the after-tax price of giving should satisfy two conditions: it must be a significant determinant of charitable giving, and it must be uncorrelated with the unobserved covariates that may affect religious attendance. Although one cannot test whether the second condition is satisfied, tables 3 and 4 clearly show that in the first-stage regressions, the after-tax price is a significant determinant of the probability of giving and the amount of contributions to religious organizations.
I start with investigating the impact of the probability of giving to a religious organization on religious participation. The results from the 2SLS and IV-tobit models reported in table 8 suggest that compared with those who do not give to religious organizations, those who donate to religious organizations allocate around 123% to 141% more time for religious participation. The IV-FE model suggests that this effect is much higher once the unobserved individual effects are controlled for. The IV-FE estimate implies that once those who do not contribute to religious causes start to contribute to religious organizations, their religious participation on average is expected to increase by 274%. The impact of the probability of giving to a religious organization on religious attendance is positive and highly significant for all subgroups in 2SLS and IV-tobit models. However, IV-FE models estimated separately for whites, blacks, and Catholics reveal that this effect is insignificant for these groups once the individual fixed effects are controlled for.
The last three columns of table 8 document the effect of the amount of religious contributions on religious participation. The 2SLS and IV-tobit models suggest that a 1% increase in the amount of religious contributions is associated with around a 0.15% to 0.17% increase in the number of days that the respondent reported participating in a religious service. The IV-FE model generates a larger impact of religious giving on religious participation. In this model, a 1% increase in the amount of religious contributions is associated with a 0.42% increase in religious attendance. Compared with other groups, the impact of religious giving on religious participation is relatively larger for blacks. Furthermore, IV-FE models estimated separately for whites and Catholics show that this effect is insignificant for these groups.
V. Discussion and Conclusion
Policymakers promote tax relief for charitable donors who itemize their donations on their federal and state tax returns. However, the literature mostly focuses on the immediate effect of such policies on charitable contributions and often ignores their spillover effects. Most charitable giving by individuals in the United States goes to religious causes. Although one would expect that charitable subsidies encourage religious giving, there may also be offsetting costs to subsidizing charity if giving to religious causes and religious participation are substitutes. Although few studies have investigated the relationship between religious giving and attendance, they offer mixed results and use cross-sectional data due to the lack of panel surveys that contain information on both religious giving and participation.
In this paper, I investigate the spillover effects of charitable subsidies on religious attendance using the COPPS, a newly available panel data set of religious giving and participation. Compared with other surveys of its kind, the COPPS contains more reliable information on religious The effects of the decision to give to a religious organization and log(amount of religious contributions þ 1) on log(average number of days that the respondent reported attending a religious service per month þ 0.1) are reported. In all models, the instrument is log(after-tax price of giving). All regressions include a set of control variables and state and year effects as discussed in the text and as presented in table 1. FE models also control for individual fixed effects but exclude time-invariant covariates such as gender, race, and age. Average marginal effects calculated at E[Y|Y > log(0.1), X) are reported for IV-tobit models. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses. The estimate is statistically significant at *10%, **5%, and ***1%.
37 In these models, the dependent variable is log(number of days that the respondent reported attending a religious service per month þ 0.1). Using the level-dependent variable instead of the log-transformed outcome yields comparable estimates. 1719 THE IMPACT OF CHARITABLE SUBSIDIES ON RELIGION attendance and allows controlling for unobserved timeinvariant individual effects that may jointly affect religious giving and participation. Following and Kim (2013) , I use the after-tax price of giving as an independent instrument for identifying the substitutability or complementarity of religious giving and attendance.
In contrast to , using the FE models that control for unobserved individual factors that may be correlated with religious giving and participation, I document that religious giving and attendance are economic complements. Hence, policies that encourage religious giving have positive spillover effects on religious attendance. A 1% increase in the after-tax price of giving is associated with a 0.1 percentage point decrease in the probability of giving to a religious organization and 0.6% decrease in the amount of religious contributions. The same magnitude of increase in the after-tax price of giving also decreases religious participation by 0.27%. Furthermore, these results are robust to the potential endogeneity of income, itemization status, and the tax price, and the possible existence of omitted factors that vary jointly by income group and year, jointly by state and year, and jointly by state and income group.
Using the after-tax price as an instrument for the probability of contributing to religious organizations and the amount of religious donations, I also document the causal link between religious giving and religious participation. In the FE models, I find that those who give to religious organizations allocate 274% more time for participating in religious services than those who do not donate to religious organizations. Similarly, a 1% increase in the amount of religious contributions is associated with a 0.42% increase in religious attendance.
My estimate of the cross-price elasticity of religious giving with respect to the after-tax price is slightly lower than but similar to the estimate of Kim (2013) , who shows that Gruber's estimates may be prone to a measurement error. In addition to the potential measurement error in Gruber's estimates, the differences between my results and Gruber's can also be attributed to the different time periods covered. 38 Since the GSS does not obtain data on religious giving for the 2003-2005 period, it is not possible to test the sensitivity of my results using data from the GSS. However, several previous studies that have used data from alternative time periods such as 1963 (Sullivan, 1985) , 1994 (Clain & Zech, 1999 ), 1991 -1995 (Kim, 2013 , and 1996 (Dahl & Ransom, 1999; Lunn et al., 2001 ) also find that religious giving and attendance are complements. This suggests that the selection of the time period does not have a significant impact on my findings.
The results of this paper highlight the positive externalities created by charitable subsidies and provide insights into alternative theoretical or empirical models that may investigate the indirect effects of charitable subsidies on other types of prosocial behavior. Given the existing literature that relates well-being, happiness, and several other social and economic outcomes to religiosity, a positive effect of charitable subsidies on religious participation would suggest that such an increase in religiosity could have a considerable positive impact on these outcomes. For instance, prior work has found that those who report attending church weekly are between 10 and 15 percentage points more likely to vote (Rosenstone & Hansen 1993; Verba, Schlozman, & Brady 1995) . Therefore, given my estimate that a 10% decrease in the after-tax price increases religious attendance by 0.07 days per month, the same magnitude of decrease in the after-tax price would increase voter turnout by around 0.2 percentage points. Cohen-Zada and Sander (2011) document that a 1 unit increase in the church attendance index (a 23% increase from its mean) increases the probability of being at least pretty happy relative to not happy by more than 7 percentage points. Given my baseline estimate that religious attendance decreases by 0.3% as a response to a 1% increase in the after-tax price of giving, a 10% increase in the after-tax price would decrease the probability of being at least pretty happy relative to not happy by around 0.9 percentage points. Moreover, adults who never attend religious services are 12.5 percentage points more likely to drink, 14.2 percentage points more likely to smoke, and 6.1 percentage points more likely to have used an illicit drug than those who attend religious services at least weekly (National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse, 2001). Hence, according to my estimates, a 10% decrease in the after-tax price would decrease the probability of drinking by 0.2 percentage points, the probability of smoking by 0.25 percentage points, and the probability of drug use by 0.1 percentage points. Although these rough estimates provide some evidence on the positive impact of charitable subsidies on several social and economic outcomes, further research is needed to establish such relationships.
